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SAFEGUARDING THE FREE EXERCISE OF 
RELIGION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
Jiwoon Kong* 
 
Religious worship is fundamentally rooted in physical and intimate 
interactions.  For instance, the Bible calls on Christian congregations to 
physically gather, receive the Lord’s Supper, sing praises, and confess their 
sins directly before ordained ministers.  However, as the highly contagious 
and airborne COVID-19 disease relentlessly swept across the nation, 
religious establishments balanced fundamental religious traditions with the 
inherent dangers of carrying out such traditions.  Inevitably, the free exercise 
of religion faces an unprecedented challenge as governors continue to enact 
executive orders limiting in-person religious worship gatherings.  The 
jurisprudence thus far has shown alarming inconsistency in the protection of 
free exercise of religion, and this Note calls on the U.S. Supreme Court to 
provide clearer guidance for lower courts.  Importantly, this Note argues that 
freedoms explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights nevertheless deserve the 
highest level of protection when infringed or burdened. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 2020, the First Pentecostal Church in Holly Springs, 
Mississippi, burned to the ground.1  Underneath the smoldering mass of 
debris, graffiti on the church parking lot pavement read “Bet you Stay home 
Now YOU HYPOKRITS.”2  A few weeks prior, the church had filed a suit 
against the city for prohibiting in-person services, but with the church 
building now burned to the ground, the city argued that “the Church’s First 
Amendment claim necessarily went up in smoke when the church did.”3  
Although the city had permitted the church to hold drive-in services, Pastor 
Jerry Waldrop nevertheless decried the destruction of the church “because 
his congregants wanted to worship in-person.”4 
 
 1. See First Pentecostal Church of Holly Springs v. City of Holly Springs, 959 F.3d 669, 
670 (5th Cir. 2020) (Willett, C.J., concurring). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Caleb Parke, Mississippi Pastor Says Church Was Burned Down “to Shame Us for 
Worshipping Together,” FOX NEWS (May 28, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/ 
coronavirus-mississippi-church-fire-graffiti-holly-springs [https://perma.cc/D785-ZMWF]. 
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Such was the peculiar reality in the spring of 2020, when all levels and 
branches of government faced the astronomical challenge of combating the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  The lethal and highly contagious virus swept swiftly 
and relentlessly across the globe.  After the first COVID-19 death in the 
United States on February 29, the country began implementing gathering 
restrictions throughout the nation to limit the spread of the airborne virus.5 
Like most other gatherings, in-person religious worship gatherings were 
generally prohibited, raising significant questions about the constitutional 
right to free exercise of religion.  President Donald Trump called for all 
houses of worship across the country to be reopened as “essential” to the 
nation.6  However, with the nature of the pandemic still relatively unknown, 
governors, legislatures, and the courts were reluctant to open establishments 
other than those directly contributing to combating the spread of the virus.  
As COVID-19 infection rates began stabilizing, and with mounting pressure 
to reopen businesses, governors began implementing phases that determined 
when, how, and to what extent businesses could reopen. 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment7 has posed a challenge 
to courts faced with conflicts between religion and the government.  Selective 
categorization of gatherings amidst reopening efforts has raised significant 
free exercise discrimination issues, predominantly regarding whether the 
state action in question satisfies the requirement of “general applicability.”  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith8 established the current standard 
for evaluating such predicaments.  Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin 
Scalia declared that burdens on religious exercise will be upheld so long as 
the state law or action is neutral and generally applicable.9  Justice Scalia 
offered an “across-the-board criminal prohibition”10 as an example of a 
neutral and generally applicable law but did not provide further guidance on 
discerning the “infinity of hard cases” involving state actions that are not as 
extreme.11 
Post-Smith free exercise jurisprudence has met its most significant 
challenge during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Such a pandemic presents the 
 
 5. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/ 
SWE5-ZSQ8].  In April, reports emerged that the earliest deaths attributable to COVID-19 
actually occurred in early February. See Stephanie Soucheray, Coroner:  First US COVID-19 
Death Occurred in Early February, CIDRAP (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/ 
news-perspective/2020/04/coroner-first-us-covid-19-death-occurred-early-february [https:// 
perma.cc/NKA6-NJZ2]. 
 6. Marisa Schultz, Trump Announces that Houses of Worship Are “Essential,” Calls on 
Governors to Open Them Up, FOX NEWS (May 22, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/ 
trump-announces-that-houses-of-worship-are-essential-calls-on-governors-to-open-them-up 
[https://perma.cc/8R3G-ZXEE]. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2. 
 8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 9. See id. at 878–79. 
 10. Id. at 884. 
 11. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:  Smith, Lukumi 
and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 859 (2001). 
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unique opportunity to examine the varied responses between states 
advocating for a higher standard of scrutiny and those following Smith.  Can 
the controversial Smith and the rational basis test truly endure during a 
pandemic affecting virtually every corner of society?  Or, will the pandemic 
finally prove the critics correct and highlight the need to subject all burdens 
on religious liberty to a higher standard of scrutiny? 
This Note sides with the latter view and advances two main arguments.  
First, this Note denounces the inconsistent application of Smith in COVID-
19 religious exemption cases and calls on the Court to clarify the general 
applicability standard when upholding burdens on free exercise.  Second, this 
Note argues that religious freedoms deserve distinctive treatment through a 
narrow application of strict scrutiny.  This Note endorses the strict scrutiny 
test as “a workable test for striking sensible balances” between religious 
freedoms and competing state interests, without impairing the compelling 
public health crisis.12  For purposes of this Note, the scope of religious 
contexts primarily will focus on Christian denominations from which the 
significant majority of COVID-19 religious exemption cases arise.13 
Part I provides the relevant contexts for the pandemic, its impact on 
religious worship, and the development of free exercise jurisprudence.  Part 
II discusses the religious exemption cases during COVID-19 and highlights 
the unguided and inconsistent application of the general applicability 
standard.  Specifically, this part argues that courts must carefully discern 
which gatherings are comparable and, to do so, the Supreme Court must step 
in to provide clearer guidance for courts in discerning general applicability.  
Part III argues that free exercise of religion deserves distinctive treatment.  
Thus, if Smith is overruled, courts should carefully apply a heightened strict 
scrutiny standard for religious exemption cases. 
I.  COVID-19 AND THE COURT’S FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
This part concerns the interaction of three distinct topics.  Part I.A 
describes events and considerations surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Part I.B discusses the impact of the pandemic on religion.  Part I.C provides 
an overview of free exercise jurisprudence as it stands today. 
A.  COVID-19 Pandemic 
On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) became 
aware of flu-like symptoms spreading in Wuhan City, China.14  In early 
January 2020, shortly before the first reported death, health officials 
 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5). 
 13. It is important to note that cases involving gathering restrictions placed on Jewish 
synagogues have also played a significant role in free exercise jurisprudence during the 
pandemic. See generally Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) 
(per curiam); Soos v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 3d 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 14. See Timeline:  WHO’s COVID-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who. 
int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline [https://perma.cc/ 
D6J3-S4XR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
2021] SAFEGUARDING FREE EXERCISE 1593 
determined the cause was a new coronavirus.15  On January 21, WHO 
confirmed the human-to-human transmission of the virus, with Thailand, 
South Korea, Japan, and the United States confirming their first cases.16  
Through the rest of January and February, the virus spread through Asia, 
Europe, North America, and South America.17  On February 29, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed the first death in the 
United States.18 
As of early March, the virus was still relatively unknown, with scientific 
and political opinion sharply divided on how best to combat the virus; 
medical organizations debated the effectiveness of social distancing 
protocols and personal protective equipment (PPE).19  Nonetheless, as of 
March 17, over 5000 were infected, with nearly one hundred casualties.20 
The next day, California issued the nation’s first statewide stay-at-home 
order,21 urging all nonessential workers to stay home.  Within the week, 
Illinois, New York, and Michigan declared their own statewide orders.22  
Following President Trump’s declaration of COVID-19 as a public health 
emergency, between March 1 and May 31, forty-two states implemented 
gathering restrictions to some extent, with the most severely affected states, 
such as New York and New Jersey, implementing stricter directives.23 
In mid-May, some southern and western states began to roll back their 
stay-at-home orders, allowing businesses such as gyms, hair and nail salons, 
and restaurants to reopen pursuant to health and safety measures.24  Other 
states—as well as health officials—expressed concern for reopening the 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id; see also Statement on the First Meeting of the International Health Regulations 
(2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/23-01-2020-statement-
on-the-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-
regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov) [https://perma.cc/UNE8-W4W4]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Emma Newburger, Washington State Confirms First US Death from Coronavirus, 
CNBC (Feb. 29, 2020, 5:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/29/washington-state-
confirms-first-us-death-from-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/58U8-WU4E]. 
 19. German Lopez, The Evidence for Everyone Wearing Masks, Explained, VOX (Apr. 4, 
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/3/31/21198132/coronavirus-covid-face-masks-n95-
respirator-ppe-shortage [https://perma.cc/C2QC-CXQN]; see also Tina Hesman Saey, Why 6 
Feet May Not Be Enough Social Distance to Avoid COVID-19, SCIENCENEWS (Apr. 17, 2020, 
6:00 AM), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-covid-19-why-6-feet-may-not-
be-enough-social-distance [https://perma.cc/BA2M-BHCU]. 
 20. See supra note 14. 
 21. Phil Helsel, California Issues Statewide Stay-at-Home Order in Coronavirus Fight, 
NBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020, 10:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-
issues-statewide-stay-home-order-coronavirus-fight-n1164471 [https://perma.cc/SM29-
YQWE]. 
 22. See Coronavirus Restrictions and Mask Mandates for All 50 States, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-map-coronavirus.html 
[https://perma.cc/3CQA-RH28]. 
 23. See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020). 
 24. See supra note 22. 
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economy too prematurely.25  During the summer months, the southern and 
western states—particularly those that partially reopened their economies—
experienced a surge in cases, leading to the reinstatement of some stay-at-
home orders.26  Other states continued reopening efforts, implementing 
social distancing and PPE measures to reduce the spread of the virus.27 
As of February 4, 2021, WHO had confirmed over 26 million cases and 
over 452,000 deaths in the United States and 100 million cases and 2.29 
million deaths worldwide.28 
B.  The Pandemic’s Impact on Religion in the United States 
In Washington State, a 122-member choir normally gathers every Tuesday 
evening at Mount Vernon Presbyterian Church for two-and-a-half-hour 
rehearsals.29  On March 15, 2020, the choir director notified the choir that six 
members had begun experiencing fevers, and by March 17, twenty-four 
members reported flu-like symptoms and at least three positive COVID-19 
test results.30  In total, fifty-three members were affected, and two members 
ultimately died from the virus.31 
This event is noted as one of the earliest “super-spreader” events during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.32  Such events have drawn considerable attention 
to religious worship and its role in spreading the virus.  Some have vocalized 
the importance of providing spiritual support during a pandemic, while others 
have proclaimed that it is “‘not Christian’ to hold in-person services during 
a pandemic.”33 
Nearly all religious practices and traditions encompass intimate, face-to-
face interactions.  Christian denominations, specifically, generally believe 
that their congregations must meet in person each week to worship together 
as called on by God, who created humans as physical beings to gather and 
worship together.34  Religious rituals, such as the Lord’s Supper, are intimate 
and vital acts of the Christian faith that require the physical administering of 
 
 25. See Christina Maxouris & Amir Vera, US Is Still “Knee-Deep” in the First Wave of 
the Coronavirus Pandemic, Fauci Says, CNN (July 7, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2020/07/06/health/us-coronavirus-monday/index.html [https://perma.cc/3TUG-T8KN]. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 
1, 2021, 10:19 AM), https://covid19.who.int/table [https://perma.cc/F4LG-FD5T]  
 29. See Lea Hamner et al., High SARS-CoV-2 Attack Rate Following Exposure at a Choir 
Practice—Skagit County, Washington, March 2020, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (May 15, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6919e6.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VKS6-FXR3]. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(quoting Doral Chenoweth III, Video:  DeWine Says It’s “Not Christian” to Hold Church 
During Coronavirus, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 1, 2020, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20200401/video-dewine-says-itrsquos-ldquonot-
christianrdquo-to-hold-church-during-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/G3QU-ZLXW]). 
 34. See Acts 20:7; 1 Corinthians 15, 16:2; Genesis 2:7. 
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bread and wine as the representation or embodiment of the body and blood 
of Jesus Christ.35  Congregational singing is particularly essential to the 
Protestant worship experience, as it represents an outpouring of thankfulness 
and filling of the heart with the Holy Spirit.  The Bible calls on believers to 
“sing[] psalms and hymns and spiritual songs.”36  Apostle Paul also teaches 
that, through singing, believers shall “[give] thanks always and for 
everything to God the Father in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.”37 
Inevitably, the risk of transmission associated with physical contact and 
singing have compelled religious worshipers to endure a cautious and 
reluctant transition to online worship, drive-in services, and virtual 
community groups.38  Furthermore, death and mourning are deeply religious 
life events that typically bring people together.39  The pandemic’s increased 
death toll, for many, has produced a greater need for religious traditions, yet 
social distancing and appropriate health measures continue to prevent the 
customary exercise of such traditions.40 
As of late 2019, Christianity is the largest religion in the United States, 
with approximately 167 million adult Christians in the country.41  However, 
nearly one-fifth of regular church attendees are not participating in online 
worship services, and the numbers are even greater for those who were 
already not regularly attending service.42  Nearly 12 percent of religious 
individuals indicated that their primary houses of worship did not provide 
alternative virtual solutions, while nearly 5 percent indicated that they were 
unsure.43 
 
 35. See Shorter Catechism, THE ORTHODOX PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, 
https://www.opc.org/sc.html [https://perma.cc/R36U-K3K7] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (“The 
Lord’s supper is a sacrament, wherein, by giving and receiving bread and wine according to 
Christ’s appointment, his death is showed forth; and the worthy receivers are, not after a 
corporal and carnal manner, but by faith, made partakers of his body and blood, with all his 
benefits, to their spiritual nourishment and growth in grace.”). 
 36. Colossians 3:16. 
 37. Ephesians 5:20. 
 38. See Hamner et al., supra note 29; see also Rebecca Heilweil, Religious Leaders Are 
Becoming Content Creators to Keep Their Followers Engaged, VOX (Sept. 18, 2020, 4:39 
PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/9/18/21443661/religion-logging-off-online-
engagement-content-creators [https://perma.cc/YH5U-W5N7]; Emily McFarlan Miller, 
Churches Go Back to the Future with Drive-in Services in the Time of the Coronavirus, 
RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://religionnews.com/2020/03/23/churches-go-
back-to-the-future-with-drive-in-services-in-the-time-of-the-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/RNY6-5TZV]. 
 39. See Joseph O. Baker et al., Religion in the Age of Social Distancing:  How COVID-19 
Presents New Directions for Research, 81 SOCIO. RELIGION 357, 358 (2020). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 
17, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-decline-of-christianity-continues-
at-rapid-pace/ [https://perma.cc/A7VG-ZGDF]. 
 42. See Claire Gecewicz, Few Americans Say Their House of Worship Is Open, but a 




 43. Id. 
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Thus, like most other aspects of society, the pandemic has drastically 
affected religious worship.  Whereas the gravity and nature of the pandemic 
has, for some, produced a greater “demand” for religious practices, traditions, 
comfort, and support, COVID-19 public health concerns have severely 
limited the “supply” of customary religious experiences.44  While some have 
embraced this opportunity to assist public health efforts, others have 
questioned how to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God 
the things that are God’s.”45 
C.  Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares that Congress 
“shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”46  The second clause is the Free Exercise Clause, 
which prohibits government interference with religious beliefs and 
practices.47  The most common issue in free exercise jurisprudence arises 
when a neutral and generally applicable state law or action has the incidental 
effect of interfering with a particular religious practice or belief.48  In 
analyzing this issue, the Court has generally raised two inquiries:  (1) whether 
the law is in fact neutral and generally applicable; and (2) whether the law, if 
not neutral and generally applicable, is nevertheless supported by a 
compelling and narrowly tailored state interest.49  If neither inquiry is 
satisfied, then the state action or law may not exempt religious gatherings 
from favorable categorizations.50 
The Court established the current law through its ruling in Smith and other 
significant developments in 1993.  However, the development of this 
jurisprudence has been controversial at times.  Cases regarding religious 
gathering restrictions during COVID-19 often have turned on the question of 
general applicability and whether state interests were tailored narrowly 
enough to justify the burden on religious gatherings. 
1.  Early Developments and the Sherbert Test 
In addressing free exercise issues, the Supreme Court first distinguished 
between religious belief and religious conduct.  The Free Exercise Clause 
“embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first 
is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”51  Whereas the 
 
 44. See Baker et al., supra note 39, at 358. 
 45. Matthew 22:21. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 47. Id. cl. 2. 
 48. See Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 482 
(2017) (“With the Free Exercise Clause, the persistently recurring issue has been whether the 
government should provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.”). 
 49. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 50. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 51. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
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freedom to believe is unquestionably protected, the freedom to act on those 
beliefs may be subject to regulation by the government.52 
The first free exercise of religion case before the Supreme Court, Reynolds 
v. United States,53 addressed this distinction.  In this 1878 case, a grand jury 
indicted George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, for practicing polygamy in violation of a federal statute.54  
Reynolds argued that the practice of polygamy was essential to the Mormon 
faith.55  However, the Court ultimately deemed the statute constitutional, 
concluding that, although the government may not regulate or punish 
individuals because of their religious beliefs, it may regulate conduct 
motivated by such beliefs.56  The Court justified denying an exemption to the 
law for the church by stating that Congress has the ability to “reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive to good order.”57  The 
Court further appealed to the concept of equality before the law, stating that 
exemptions for religiously motivated conduct that would otherwise be 
regulated would place “religious belief superior to the law of the land.”58  On 
the other hand, the Court has kept the door “tightly closed against any 
governmental regulation of religious beliefs.”59 
The Court did not hear a free exercise case again until 1940, in Cantwell 
v. Connecticut.60  Here, in striking down a state statute creating a prior 
restraint on a Jehovah’s Witness’s free exercise of his religion, the Court 
expanded free exercise protections to state and local laws.61  The Court ruled 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protection against state action incorporates 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.62 
Together, Reynolds and Cantwell formed the initial scope of free exercise 
cases.  First, the government may only regulate religious conduct, not 
religious belief.63  Second, the Court expanded religious liberty, as protected 
by the First Amendment to state and local laws.64  This expanded 
understanding of the First Amendment significantly strengthened 
individuals’ religious liberty protections under the Constitution.  However, 
the Court had yet to specify a consistent standard of review or framework for 
evaluating such cases and therefore, a series of conflicting decisions 
followed. 
 
 52. See id. at 304. 
 53. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 54. Id. at 146. 
 55. Id. at 161. 
 56. Id. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”). 
 57. Id. at 164. 
 58. See id. at 166–67. 
 59. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).  See generally Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 
U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
U.S. 105 (1943). 
 60. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 61. Id. at 308–11. 
 62. See id. at 305. 
 63. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
 64. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308–11. 
1598 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
Finally, in the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner,65 the Supreme Court 
created its first framework for evaluating free exercise claims.  Adell 
Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was discharged by her employer due to 
her refusal to work on Saturdays, her faith’s Sabbath.66  After failing to obtain 
other employment, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation 
benefits.67  The South Carolina law at issue deemed individuals to be 
ineligible for such benefits if they failed to “accept available suitable work 
when offered.”68  The state subsequently denied Sherbert unemployment 
benefits, concluding that she had failed to accept suitable employment when 
offered, despite its conflict with her religious beliefs.69  The state reasoned 
that allowing exemptions to the unemployment compensation laws for 
religious individuals would “dilute the unemployment compensation fund” 
and “hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work.”70 
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Sherbert and utilized a 
two-step analysis.71  First, the Court deliberated on whether the state law 
placed any burden on Sherbert’s religious practice.72  The Court emphatically 
concluded that such a burden existed, stating that her ineligibility for benefits 
derived solely from the practice of her religion and forced her to choose 
between following her religion and forfeiting benefits.73  Second, the Court 
considered whether the state showed a compelling state interest justifying the 
burden on Sherbert’s religious practice.74  To satisfy this standard, the Court 
required more than a “merely . . . rational relationship to some colorable state 
interest” in such a “highly sensitive constitutional area.”75  In stating that 
only “the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for 
permissible limitation,” the Court concluded that the dilution of the 
unemployment fund and possible scheduling issues fell short of such a 
standard.76  Even if the state could prove a likely increase in fraudulent 
claims or scheduling issues, the Court required the government to show that 
no alternative methods could “combat such abuses without infringing First 
Amendment rights.”77  Thus, the state was required to further justify its 
burden on religious belief or practice by showing that the state action was the 
least restrictive means for achieving the state interest. 
 
 65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 66. See id. at 399. 
 67. Id. at 399–400. 
 68. Id. at 401. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. at 407. 
 71. See id. at 402–04. 
 72. Id. at 403 (“We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits 
imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.  We think it is clear that it 
does.”). 
 73. Id. at 404. 
 74. Id. at 406. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 406–07 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 77. Id. at 407. 
2021] SAFEGUARDING FREE EXERCISE 1599 
The Court thus established the Sherbert test, which requires the 
government to prove that the allegedly infringing law (1) furthers a 
compelling state interest and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve the state 
interest.78  If the government succeeds in proving these elements, plaintiffs 
must comply with the law regardless of their religious exercises.79  If the 
government fails to meet its burden, then plaintiffs are granted an exemption 
from the law.80 
2.  Yoder and the Limited Application of the Sherbert Test 
The Court extended the Sherbert test beyond state unemployment 
compensation laws and into criminal law in Wisconsin v. Yoder.81  An Amish 
family contested a Wisconsin criminal statute that imposed sanctions on 
parents whose children did not attend school through the age of sixteen.82  
The family claimed that this conflicted with the Amish religion, which 
required them to be insulated from “worldly influence” and to be trained in 
the self-reliant, agrarian community during their formative years.83  The state 
responded that the compulsory education was intended to develop a 
productive, self-reliant citizenry.84 
The Supreme Court, applying the Sherbert test, concluded that nothing in 
the record showed that the state interest in public education outweighed the 
“grave interference” with Amish belief and practices.85  The Court 
additionally held that the state could still achieve its interest in a productive 
citizenry by requiring education only through age fourteen, eliminating the 
burden to the Amish community’s right to freely exercise its religion while 
still serving the state’s interest.86  Because the state failed to show that 
compulsory education was the least restrictive means to achieve its 
compelling interest, the Court concluded that the Amish were 
constitutionally entitled to an exemption from the law.87 
Despite its application and expansion in Yoder, the Court applied the 
Sherbert test in only three other unemployment benefits cases from 1972 to 
1990.88  These three cases—along with Sherbert—became known as the 
“Sherbert Quartet.”89  In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
 
 78. Id. at 403. 
 79. See id.  
 80. See id. 
 81. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 82. Id. at 207–09. 
 83. Id. at 210. 
 84. Id. at 221. 
 85. Id. at 218. 
 86. Id. at 222. 
 87. See id. at 218, 234. 
 88. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110, 1120 (1990) (referring to Yoder as the “last major free exercise 
victory”). 
 89. Prabha Sipi Bhandari, Note, The Failure of Equal Regard to Explain the Sherbert 
Quartet, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 97 (1997). 
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Employment Security Division,90 Eddie Thomas refused his employer’s 
request to transfer him from a manufacturing department to an industrial 
department that produced military equipment.91  Thomas reasoned that the 
industrial work conflicted with his pacifist religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s 
Witness.92  Thomas subsequently quit and was denied unemployment 
benefits.93  Ruling in favor of Thomas, the Court stated that “only those 
interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion.”94  The Court arrived at similar conclusions in Hobbie 
v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,95 ruling that a state could not deny 
unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who was fired for 
refusing to work on the Sabbath.96  The Court added that it made no 
difference that the employee adopted certain religious practices after 
employment began; it is nonetheless an impermissible burden to compel 
employees to modify their religious practices to qualify for unemployment 
benefits.97  In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Income Security,98 the Court 
similarly ruled that a state may not deny unemployment benefits due to a 
person’s refusal to work on the Sabbath, even if that person holds a sincere 
belief independent of membership in any established religion.99 
Beyond the Sherbert quartet and Yoder, the Court rejected every claim 
requesting exemption from burdensome laws.100  The Sherbert test came 
under increasing scrutiny in the 1980s, and the Court began narrowing the 
concept of “significant burden” while more readily labeling state interests as 
“compelling” where religious practice was significantly burdened.  For 
example, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,101 the 
Court reversed a lower court injunction prohibiting the U.S. Forest Service 
from building a roadway based on the rationale that it would damage grounds 
historically used by Native Americans for religious rituals.102   The Court 
reasoned that the impact on religious practice was incidental—as opposed to 
an explicit prohibition of such practice—and thus did not require the 
government to bring forward a compelling justification.103  In United States 
v. Lee,104 the Court denied an exemption for an Amish employer who refused 
to pay social security tax, stating that “it would be difficult to 
accommodate . . . myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious 
 
 90. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 91. See id. at 709. 
 92. See id. at 710–11. 
 93. See id. at 710–12. 
 94. See id. at 718 (alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 
(1972)). 
 95. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
 96. See id. at 139–42. 
 97. See id. at 143–44. 
 98. 489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
 99. See id. at 834–35. 
 100. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 1110. 
 101. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 102. Id. at 458. 
 103. Id. at 450–51. 
 104. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
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beliefs.”105  Surveying the application of the test, one commentator criticized 
the test as “more talk than substance,” referring to the Court’s reluctance to 
side with free exercise claimants.106  Others noted that the test was “strict in 
theory but feeble in fact.”107 
Thus, through the 1980s, the Court loosened the standard set by Sherbert, 
marking an extensive period of religious exemption denials.  This period 
eventually culminated in the Court’s full departure from strict scrutiny in its 
1990 decision in Smith. 
3.  The Smith Requirements:  Neutrality and General Applicability 
In Smith, two Native Americans, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were 
terminated from their counselor positions at a drug rehabilitation clinic for 
ingesting a hallucinogenic substance called peyote.108  The claimants 
ingested the substance for sacramental purposes at a Native American 
Church ceremony.109  Upon denial of unemployment compensation benefits, 
Smith and Black filed suit claiming that such denial was a violation of their 
right to free exercise of religion.110 
The Court ultimately refused to grant an exception to the claimants.111  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia first distinguished prior free exercise 
cases granting exemptions to claimants, stating that those cases were limited 
to unemployment compensation matters that were particularly suited for 
applying exemptions.112  Specifically, Justice Scalia distinguished the 
Sherbert line of cases, reasoning that those cases “stand for the proposition 
that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions,” the state 
may not refuse to incorporate cases of religious hardship without a 
compelling reason.113  In other words, unemployment compensation 
programs already involve examination of individual circumstances to 
evaluate for possible exemptions.114  This is distinguishable from an “across-
the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct,” such as the 
use of peyote.115 
 
 105. See id. at 253 (distinguishing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
 106. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 1109. 
 107. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:  The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994).  
Notably, Professors Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager argued that the Sherbert 
test was not suited for religious exemption cases in general.  However, in cases involving 
administrative systems evaluating individuals on a case-by-case basis, such as those in the 
Sherbert quartet, Eisgruber and Sager argued that a refusal of benefits on religious grounds 
“represent[ed] a failure of equal regard” as compared to benefits granted for those who quit 
their jobs for secular reasons, such as family or health. See id. at 1287. 
 108. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 872. 
 111. Id. at 890. 
 112. Id. at 884. 
 113. Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (plurality opinion)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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Additionally, Justice Scalia controversially distinguished prior cases 
upholding exemptions, including Yoder, as “hybrid”116 cases that involved 
“not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but . . . other constitutional protections,” 
such as free speech or parental rights.117  The Court reasoned that because 
such cases involved other constitutional rights, they were not applicable to 
Smith in this case.118  Because the facts in this case did not present “such a 
hybrid situation,” the Court did not apply similar constitutional protections 
as those granted in Yoder.119 
In so ruling, the Court abandoned the compelling state interest test from 
Sherbert, deemed to be “courting anarchy” due to the diversity of religious 
beliefs in the United States.120  Instead, the Court held that religious beliefs 
may not be grounds for exemption when concerned with “valid and neutral 
law[s] of general applicability.”121  A state could justify a law with incidental 
burdens on religious practice so long as the law was neutral and generally 
applicable.122 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, though concurring in the judgment, 
disagreed with the Court’s abandonment of the compelling state interest 
standard.123  The First Amendment, Justice O’Connor stated, “does not 
distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target 
particular religious practices.”124  Although Justice Scalia and the majority 
held that generally applicable laws are “one large step” removed from laws 
regulating specific religious practices,125 Justice O’Connor contended that 
the First Amendment “ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and 
hypothetical situation in which a State directly targets a religious 
practice.”126  Furthermore, Justice O’Connor pointed out that the Court’s 
protection of generally applicable laws entailed explicitly overruling Yoder, 
where the Court acknowledged areas of conduct protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause “beyond the power of the State to control, even under 
 
 116. Id. at 882. 
 117. Id. at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars 
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved 
not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections . . . .”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 882 (stating that the facts of the case show “a free exercise claim unconnected 
with any communicative activity or parental right”). 
 120. Id. at 888 (stating that applying the Sherbert test “would open the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every 
conceivable kind”). 
 121. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment)). 
 122. Id. at 878 (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of 
printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”). 
 123. Id. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 124. Id. at 894. 
 125. Id. at 878 (majority opinion). 
 126. Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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regulations of general applicability.”127  In effect, Justice O’Connor believed 
that the Smith requirements of neutrality and general applicability are 
“merely evidence of a legitimate state interest, not reasons to change the 
standard for evaluating that interest.”128 
Justice Harry Blackmun, in his dissent, similarly expressed concern for the 
Court’s overruling a “settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”129  He first clarified that the state interest 
involved is not the “broad interest in fighting the critical ‘war on drugs’” but 
the “State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious, 
ceremonial use of peyote.”130  Following the evidentiary reasoning in Yoder 
and Thomas,  Justice Blackmun undermined the state’s alleged compelling 
interest, stating that Oregon had never enforced a peyote prohibition nor was 
there any evidence that peyote “has ever harmed anyone.”131  Additionally, 
Justice Blackmun described the majority’s assertion that granting an 
exemption would cause “a flood of other claims to religious exemptions” as 
“purely speculative” and inconsistent with prior cases granting exemptions 
in the face of similarly speculative arguments.132 
Smith remains a highly controversial case.  Some have vehemently 
supported the decision, claiming that religious exemptions create “a 
constitutional preference for religious over non-religious belief systems”133 
that unfairly “insulate[s] religious beliefs from social forces,” while 
“competing secular beliefs . . . must stand or fall on their own accord.”134  
Others found the decision “troubling, bordering on the shocking,”135 arguing 
that the First Amendment “treats religious belief differently—sometimes 
 
 127. Id. at 896 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).  Justice O’Connor 
also extracted language from Yoder contradicting the Court’s opinion on neutrality. Id. (“A 
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(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972))). 
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 129. Smith, 494 U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981). 
 132. Smith, 494 U.S. at 916–17 (Blackman, J., dissenting). 
 133. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 308, 319 (1991). 
 134. Id. at 322; see also Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 
29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1961); Mark Tushnet, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court:  
Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 390 (asserting that granting religious exemptions 
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 135. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 1120. 
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better, sometimes worse” and echoing the sentiments of Justice O’Connor 
and Justice Blackmun.136 
4.  Lukumi:  Neutrality and General Applicability Defined 
During the three years following Smith, an onslaught of free exercise cases 
decided against religious groups culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.137  This case 
involved a Santeria church that engaged in animal sacrifice as a central form 
of devotion.138  The City of Hialeah attempted to prohibit such a religious 
practice through ordinances with the intent of “protecting the public health 
and preventing cruelty to animals.”139  In its decision, the Court applied the 
general propositions from Smith—that a law that is neutral and of general 
applicability “need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest 
even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious 
practice.”140  A law is not neutral and generally applicable must then be 
justified by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.141 
First, unlike its view of the prohibition of peyote in Smith, the Court found 
the ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice to be neither neutral nor generally 
applicable.142  In analyzing neutrality, the Court weighed the object of the 
city ordinances against the burden on the Santeria church’s religious 
practices.143  In doing so, the Court ultimately found sufficient evidence—
particularly in the legislative history of the ordinances—of improper 
targeting of the Santeria church and thus, concluded that the object of the 
ordinances was to suppress religion.144  In particular, the Court concluded 
that the broad ordinances prohibited the Santeria church’s practice of animal 
sacrifice even when it did not threaten the city’s interest in public health.145  
The ordinances “gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of 
animals but to exclude almost all secular killings” thus “target[ing]” the 
Santeria church.146 
Next, the Court held that the ordinances were not generally applicable.147  
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy declined to “define with precision the 
 
 136. See Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
329, 331 (1991); see also Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 
YALE L.J. 1611, 1643 (1992) (“[T]he Court in Employment Division v. Smith lumped religious 
values together with secular ones and permitted no conscience to trump the political process, 
to become ‘a law unto itself.’” (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 890)). 
 137. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 138. Id. at 524. 
 139. Id. at 543. 
 140. Id. at 531. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 546. 
 143. Id. at 533–34. 
 144. Id. at 541–42. 
 145. Id. at 538–39. 
 146. Id. at 542. 
 147. Id. at 543. 
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standard used to evaluate” general applicability, he nevertheless concluded 
that Hialeah’s ordinances fell “well below the minimum standard necessary 
to protect First Amendment rights.”148  Notably, Justice Kennedy examined 
the ordinances’ inclusivity, evaluating whether similar, nonreligious conduct 
was also subjected to similar prohibitions.149  The Court ultimately 
concluded that the ordinances were underinclusive because they failed to 
prohibit “nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or 
greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.”150  For example, the Court cited 
fishing, extermination of mice, and the hunting of hogs as examples of 
nonreligious conduct that nevertheless were not prohibited by the city 
ordinances.151  Additionally, the Court pointed out that the city failed to 
regulate actors who improperly disposed of carcasses, such as hunters or 
restaurants, but only found an issue when it “results from religious 
exercise.”152  In sum, the Court concluded that only conduct specific to the 
Santeria church was subjected to the ordinances and thus the ordinances were 
not generally applicable.153 
After determining that the ordinances were discriminatory, the Court 
examined whether they were nevertheless justified by a compelling state 
interest and if they were narrowly tailored to achieve such an interest.  
Drawing from the Smith requirement analysis, the Court concluded that the 
ordinances were “overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects” to 
justify its alleged state interests.154  The Court reasoned that the 
government’s failure to restrict similar secular conduct, while also limiting 
conduct protected by the First Amendment, is an indication that the “interest 
given in justification of the restriction is not compelling.”155  Thus, Lukumi 
applied the tenets of Smith by first discerning neutrality and general 
applicability, then on a finding of discrimination, further examined the case 
under strict scrutiny. 
Although Smith established neutrality and general applicability as the main 
requirements for discerning religious exemption cases, Lukumi elaborated 
and established the framework for evaluating these requirements.  Despite 
Justice Kennedy’s reluctance to define a particular standard for discerning 
either neutrality or general applicability, he nevertheless provided ample 
guidelines for analysis.156 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 543–44. 
 152. Id. at 545. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 546. 
 155. Id. at 546–47.  Justice Kennedy further stated that, “[i]t is established in our strict 
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Id. at 547 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989) 
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 156. See id. at 543. 
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Neutrality is determined by the object of the law, and general applicability 
involves categories of selection.157  Essentially, any law affecting religion 
must use the proper means (general applicability) to achieve a proper end 
(neutrality).158  In analyzing neutrality, the breadth of the state action or law 
is examined to see if its burden on religious exercise is necessary to satisfy 
the state interest; if the burden is not necessary, then the law is deemed 
nonneutral.159  In other words, neutrality examines whether the state action 
or law targets a specific religion or religion generally.  General applicability 
analysis discerns inclusiveness; if religious exercise is burdened while 
similarly situated secular practices are not, then the law is deemed 
underinclusive and thus not generally applicable.160  In this manner, 
neutrality is a necessary component of a law of general applicability, and a 
“failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not 
been satisfied.”161 
For example, the prohibition of peyote in Smith was deemed neutral by the 
Court because the object of the law—to abolish drug trafficking and protect 
the health and safety of citizens—required necessary participation from both 
religious and nonreligious citizens.162  In other words, to create exemptions 
for religious use of peyote would frustrate the state’s ability to curb the use 
of harmful substances.  The prohibition was deemed generally applicable 
because similarly situated secular conduct—in fact, all uses of peyote—were 
subjected to the same prohibition. 
The across-the-board prohibition of peyote is distinguishable from the 
ordinances in Lukumi that were found to limit slaughtering of animals only 
when undertaken by the Santeria church, while permitting other forms of 
slaughter without similar regulations.163  Justice Kennedy emphasized that 
although “[a]ll laws are selective to some extent . . . categories of selection 
are of paramount concern” when religious exercise is burdened.164  By 
limiting slaughtering for religious purposes but not for other similar secular 
purposes, the Hialeah ordinances failed to meet the standards of general 
applicability.165 
 
 157. See Bogen, supra note 128, at 208. 
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5.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
In the aftermath of Smith, religious and civil liberties groups banded 
together to draft and support the passage of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993166 (RFRA).  Passing with overwhelming support in 
both chambers of Congress, the RFRA was signed into law on November 17, 
1993, by President Bill Clinton.  The RFRA reestablished the Sherbert test 
as the default standard for evaluating free exercise claims, “guarantee[ing] 
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened.”167  Specifically, the law expressly provided that a government 
“shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability,” directly challenging 
Smith.168  Only when supported by a compelling state interest that is narrowly 
tailored to further that interest may the government place any burden on 
religious practices.169 
However, the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores170 in 
1997 diminished the RFRA significantly.  The Court ruled the RFRA 
unconstitutional as applied to the states, as it was beyond congressional 
authority to compel states to provide greater protection of religious liberty 
than the First Amendment.171  The Court stated that the law was “a 
considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional 
prerogatives”172 and “contradict[ed] vital principles necessary to maintain 
separation of powers and the federal balance.”173 
Despite this setback, the Supreme Court has continued to uphold 
applications of the RFRA to the federal government without addressing 
constitutional questions.  In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao 
Do Vegetal,174 the U.S. Customs Services’s seizure of hoasca—a tea used by 
the respondent-church for communion purposes—was held unjustified under 
the RFRA because the government failed to show a sufficient compelling 
state interest.175  Notably, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, 
echoed the reasoning in Yoder that the compelling interest test is satisfied 
 
 166. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
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through “application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular 
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially 
burdened.”176  In narrowing the scope of inquiry under the RFRA to the 
particular exemption in question, the Court found the compelling state 
interest to be unfounded and concluded that “there is no indication that 
Congress . . . considered the harms posed by . . . the sacramental use of 
hoasca by the [church].”177 
In the more recent Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,178 the Court again 
upheld an exemption for religious liberty claimants.  Here, corporate owners 
contested a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate 
requiring them to provide coverage for contraceptive services when issuing 
health insurance plans to employees.179  The owners held that providing 
contraceptive coverage conflicted with their sincere religious beliefs.180  The 
Court ultimately ruled that the corporate owners should be exempted, holding 
that HHS failed to satisfy the RFRA’s least-restrictive-means standard and 
failed to show that “it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without 
imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.”181 
Some states have extended the protections of the federal RFRA, either by 
passing state equivalents or by construing state constitutions to adopt strict 
scrutiny.182  State supreme courts that have rejected Smith and opted for the 
strict scrutiny test often compare the text of their state constitutions to that of 
the Free Exercise Clause.  In State v. Hershberger,183 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court declared that the Minnesota Constitution’s free exercise provision 
provides “greater protection for religious liberties against governmental 
action . . . than under the first amendment of the federal constitution.”184  The 
court subsequently applied the strict scrutiny test and granted exemptions to 
the claimants.185  In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,186 the 
Washington State Supreme Court similarly ruled that the Washington 
Constitution was “stronger than the federal constitution” in protecting 
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 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 728. 
 182. See Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State 
Constitutions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 186 (2013) (listing Alaska, Indiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
 183. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). 
 184. Id. at 397. 
 185. Id. at 399. 
 186. 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). 
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conduct that “merely ‘disturbs’ another on the basis of religion.”187  In 
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,188 the Alaska Supreme 
Court similarly rejected Smith and adopted strict scrutiny, reasoning that 
Alaska is under no obligation to emulate the U.S. Supreme Court in 
evaluating religious exemption cases.189  Other notable rulings were made in 
Massachusetts and Vermont.190 
Today, in addition to the federal RFRA, twenty-one states have passed 
their own versions of the law, mandating that the state may burden the free 
exercise of religion only when in furtherance of a compelling state interest 
and via the least restrictive means.191  An additional ten states have religious 
freedom protections in place via state court decisions. 
6.  Current Law 
Smith stands as the default standard today.  So long as a state law is neutral 
and generally applicable, a state may refuse to grant a religious exemption 
even to substantially burdened religious practice, so long as it has a rational 
basis for doing so.  As detailed in Lukumi, a law is neutral if the object of the 
law is not to burden religious liberty.  A law is generally applicable if it is 
fully inclusive of all similarly situated conduct––both secular and religious.  
A law found not neutral or not generally applicable faces the Sherbert strict 
scrutiny test. 
II.  THE FAILURE OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY IN COVID-19 ORDERS 
In evaluating COVID-19 restriction cases, courts generally agree on 
several points.  First, there is little controversy concerning the neutrality 
requirement under Smith; courts largely agree that gathering restrictions 
under state executive orders are not motivated by animus toward people of 
faith and are not attempts to single out faith-based practices for disfavored 
treatment.192  Second, courts do not contest that the orders burden sincere 
faith practices.193  Third, courts generally presume that executive orders 
 
 187. Id. at 186. 
 188. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994). 
 189. Id. at 280–81. 
 190. See Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994) (stating that the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court “prefer[red] to adhere to the standards of earlier First 
Amendment jurisprudence,” specifically noting that the court had previously used “the 
balancing test that the Supreme Court had established under the free exercise of religion clause 
in Wisconsin v. Yoder”); Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 853 (Vt. 1994) (holding that the 
Vermont Constitution “protects religious liberty to the same extent that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act” does under the U.S. Constitution). 
 191. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(May 4, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-
statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/HL9Q-ET3J]. 
 192. Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Were the Governor’s orders 
motivated by animus toward people of faith?  We don’t think so. . . .  [W]e don’t think it’s fair 
at this point and on this record to say that the orders or their manner of enforcement turn on 
faith-based animus.”). 
 193. See id. at 415 (“No one contests that the orders burden sincere faith practices.”). 
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satisfy Smith’s rational basis requirement because they are intended to 
combat the spread of COVID-19.194  Lastly, the courts fully acknowledge the 
dangers of COVID-19 and have expressed little doubt that governors are 
doing their utmost in issuing executive orders to curb the spread of the 
virus.195 
The primary issue, therefore, lies in the general applicability requirement.  
Under Smith and the rational basis test, a finding of general applicability ends 
the inquiry and precludes any strict scrutiny analysis.196  However, courts are 
left unguided as to how to discern what similarly situated or comparable 
gatherings are when evaluating the general applicability of gathering 
restrictions.197  Ultimately, the fundamental right to free exercise of religion 
has been left vulnerable to inconsistent and, at times, troubling treatment. 
Therefore, this part first argues that, under Smith, the general applicability 
standard must be clarified to help courts more consistently apply the Smith 
analysis.  Specifically, the Court should step in and provide guidance on how 
to define comparable gatherings.  Even so, courts should be more careful in 
finding general applicability––either through selected criteria or through 
deference to political branches––when fundamental constitutional rights are 
involved.  Ultimately, such an unprecedented onslaught of religious 
exemption cases should prompt courts deepen to their analysis in a way 
similar to strict scrutiny rather than finding general applicability along 
unguided lines. 
Part II.A notes, for comparison purposes, the relatively uncontroversial 
court rulings at the onset of stay-at-home orders.  Part II.B discusses the 
Supreme Court’s attempt to create a framework for religious exemption cases 
in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom.198  Part II.C surveys the 
inconsistency in cases following South Bay that demonstrates the need for 
clearer guidance for the courts.  Part II.D discusses Calvary Chapel Dayton 
Valley v. Sisolak199 and the height of uncertainty for free exercise rights 
during the COVID-19.  Part II.E discusses the latest Supreme Court order in 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,200 which provided 
additional perspectives from the Court yet nevertheless failed to clarify 
general applicability. 
 
 194. See Soos v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 3d 268, 281 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[O]nly rational basis 
need be shown, which is self-evident:  preventing the spread of COVID-19.”). 
 195. See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604–05 (2020) 
(mem.) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“States and their subdivisions have responded to the pandemic 
by imposing unprecedented restrictions on personal liberty, including the free exercise of 
religion.  This initial response was understandable.  In times of crisis, public officials must 
respond quickly and decisively to evolving and uncertain situations.  At the dawn of an 
emergency—and the opening days of the COVID-19 outbreak plainly qualify—public 
officials may not be able to craft precisely tailored rules.”); see also Neace, 958 F.3d at 414 
(“We don’t doubt the Governor’s sincerity in trying to do his level best to lessen the spread of 
the virus or his authority to protect the Commonwealth’s citizens.”). 
 196. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 197. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993). 
 198. 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
 199. 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (mem.). 
 200. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam). 
2021] SAFEGUARDING FREE EXERCISE 1611 
A.  Initial Stay-at-Home Orders 
Cases decided earlier in the pandemic timeline were relatively 
uncontroversial.  Beginning in March 2020, when the virus was still 
relatively unknown, the nation experienced widespread gathering restrictions 
with very few exceptions.201  These exceptions were typically limited to 
hospitals, essential businesses, and transportation hubs.202  Thus, categories 
of establishments were binary—essential or nonessential—with uniform 
restrictions applying to the latter.  Because gathering restrictions applied 
uniformly across most industries, the executive orders were readily deemed 
to be generally applicable. 
A few claimants nevertheless alleged that allowing secular, essential 
businesses to remain open while restricting religious gatherings was a 
violation of the free exercise of religion.  For example, in Lighthouse 
Fellowship Church v. Northam,203 a church claimed that Virginia governor 
Ralph Northam’s executive orders were discriminatory because they 
restricted religious gatherings to ten individuals while “carv[ing] out broad 
exemptions for a host of secular activities,” predominantly those of essential 
businesses.204 
The Eastern District of Virginia denied the injunction, utilizing the Lukumi 
standard of analyzing neutrality and general applicability.  First, the court 
stated that the orders were neutral because they did “not refer to a religious 
practice to single it out for discriminatory treatment.”205  Rather, the orders 
“prohibit all social gatherings of more than ten individuals, secular and 
religious.”206  Second, the court found general applicability was present 
because the orders “are not underinclusive,”207 rebutting the church’s claim 
that allowing essential businesses to open is discriminatory against religious 
gatherings.  The court labeled the exemption for essential businesses as a 
“limited carveout [that] does not target religious gatherings,” stating that it 
“simply ensures that people have access to essential goods.”208  In response 
to the church’s claim that some businesses were misconstrued as essential, 
the court provided detailed justifications for opening several businesses, 
including electronic equipment stores, liquor stores, and gas station retail 
centers.209  The court added that the exemptions for essential businesses were 
 
 201. See Coronavirus Restrictions and Mask Mandates for All 50 States, supra note 22. 
 202. Id. 
 203. 458 F. Supp. 3d 418 (E.D. Va. 2020). 
 204. Id. at 429. 
 205. Id. at 428. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 432. 
 208. Id. at 430. 
 209. Id.  In defense of electronic equipment businesses, the court stated that “[w]ith more 
people working from home, people need access to electronic equipment, to the parts and labor 
necessary to repair their electronic devices.” Id.  In defense of liquor stores, the court stated 
that the “[d]anger posed by sudden alcohol withdrawal to those suffering from alcohol 
dependence, and the added burden upon health facilities that [restrictions] might trigger” is 
sufficient reasoning to keep liquor stores open. Id. at 431.  In defense of gas station retail 
centers, the court stated that “at the very least, healthcare professionals and grocery store 
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“reasonable” and were carved out for “specific reasons to avoid harms equal 
to or greater than the spread of this deadly pandemic.”210  Ultimately, 
exemptions for essential businesses were not considered to render the 
executive orders discriminatory and thus, the orders were upheld, despite the 
burden on religious practices.211 
This decision is reasonable.  States were effectively shutting down all 
operations not directly assisting in the public health efforts or sustaining 
remote work.  It was wholly understandable for the court to deny an 
exemption to a religious organization at a time when all nonessential 
gatherings were similarly restricted.212  Even if the court had reviewed under 
strict scrutiny, the state would have been likely to prevail due to the 
compelling interest of keeping essential hospitals and other businesses open 
during the initial uncertain phases of the pandemic.  Because the stay-at-
home orders were applied across the board irrespective of industry or 
location, early cases were more akin to the across-the-board prohibition of 
peyote in Smith.  Therefore, in such contexts, Smith has provided sufficient 
guidance on the application of general applicability. 
B.  Increasing Categorizations Under South Bay 
As states began to reopen businesses, restrictions were no longer across 
the board but applied on a state-by-state, establishment-by-establishment 
basis.  Courts could no longer apply the across-the-board reasoning of Smith 
but were nevertheless tasked with discerning general applicability by 
comparing religious gatherings with the activities of other nonessential 
businesses.  Free exercise claims increased drastically, with numerous 
churches claiming that secular gatherings that posed similar or greater danger 
to the states’ public health interests were subjected to more lenient 
restrictions.  Courts were now faced with the task of discerning general 
applicability as required under Smith yet were unguided by any defined 
criteria.  Spurred by the Supreme Court’s injunctive order in South Bay, 
courts were left to discern general applicability along unclear lines. 
1.  Possible Criteria for Comparison:  Proximity and Duration 
In South Bay, California governor Gavin Newsom placed a restriction on 
25 percent of building capacity or a maximum of one hundred attendees 
across all places of worship throughout the state.213  When a church sought 
an injunction against these orders, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, denied the 
 
personnel need to get to and from their essential jobs,” thus utilizing gas stations and 
purchasing essential goods from its retail centers. Id. 
 210. Id. at 432. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Although certainly related, the full extent of the discussion regarding the essentiality 
of religious worship during a public health crisis is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 213. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring). 
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injunction.214  In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts primarily 
reasoned that because religious gatherings were treated similarly to other 
comparable secular gatherings, there was no discrimination.215  Similar or 
more severe restrictions were applied to lectures, concerts, movie showings, 
spectator sports, and theatrical performances “where large groups of people 
gather in close proximity for extended periods of time.”216  More favorable 
restrictions were applied to what Chief Justice Roberts labeled as “dissimilar 
activities,”217 where people “neither congregate in large groups nor remain 
in close proximity for extended periods.”218  The opinion listed grocery 
stores, banks, and laundromats as examples of such dissimilar activities.219 
Chief Justice Roberts said nothing more regarding the disparate 
restrictions.  He did not explicitly mention the Smith requirements of 
neutrality and general applicability but concluded that the California 
guidelines “appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.”220  Chief Justice Roberts distinguished between gatherings 
based on duration and proximity, presumably these criteria were consistent 
with California’s interest in curbing the spread of COVID-19. 
In contrast, Justice Kavanaugh, in his dissent, provided a more complete 
Lukumi analysis.221  First, in his Smith analysis, Justice Kavanaugh provided 
a more exhaustive list of businesses not subject to the 25 percent occupancy 
cap, including “factories, offices, supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores, 
pharmacies, shopping malls, pet grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair 
salons, and cannabis dispensaries.”222  Viewing such establishments as 
comparable secular businesses, Justice Kavanaugh described this to be the 
“basic constitutional problem” of the case and concluded that “[s]uch 
discrimination violates the First Amendment.”223 
Having found discrimination, Justice Kavanaugh then evaluated the state 
order under strict scrutiny.224  Specifically, Justice Kavanaugh clarified that 
the compelling state interest must justify not the state action itself but the 
state’s refusal to exempt in-person religious worship.225  Justice Kavanaugh 
proposed a more focused and detailed strict scrutiny standard that required a 
compelling justification for distinguishing between religious worship 
services and comparable secular businesses, which were not subject to the 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1614. 
 216. Id. at 1613. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1614–15. 
 225. Id. at 1614.  Justice Kavanaugh admits that “California undoubtedly has a compelling 
interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health of its citizens.” Id.  
However, “restrictions inexplicably applied to one group and exempted from another do little 
to further these goals.” Id. (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020)). 
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more restrictive occupancy cap.226  Ultimately, Justice Kavanaugh stated that 
California failed to show such a compelling justification for why 
establishments such as restaurants and shopping malls were placed under 
more lenient state directives while similar leniencies were denied for 
churches.227 
Justice Kavanaugh then examined whether California’s order was the least 
restrictive means of furthering its interest in curbing COVID-19.228  He 
concluded that it was not, stating that, despite having “ample options” to 
combat the spread of COVID-19, California nevertheless discriminated 
against religion.229  These ample options included administering safety 
precautions such as social distancing and other health requirements “just as 
the Governor has done for comparable secular activities.”230 
Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh provided helpful 
starting points for discussion but ultimately raised more questions than 
answers.  Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion suggested proximity and duration 
as possible criteria to discern comparability of gatherings for the general 
applicability analysis.  Although promising, as Justice Kavanaugh pointed 
out, the application of these criteria seems incomplete.  Although it is 
convincingly clear that people typically gather for longer periods in close 
proximity at a church than a bank, it is much less clear when compared to 
factories, restaurants, and shopping malls.  For example, the concurrence did 
not address possibilities, such as gatherings in crowded offices or factory 
environments in close proximity and for long hours, or the relative dangers 
of restaurant patrons dining and conversing with no masks on.  In this light, 
Chief Justice Roberts seemingly omitted such entities in his opinion and 
instead included only those deemed to be essential businesses in prior 
cases.231  In considering the more exhaustive list of more favorably treated 
secular gatherings, it is considerably more difficult to see why on the basis 
of duration and proximity that these gatherings are fundamentally distinct 
from that of religious gatherings. 
Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s seemingly incomplete analysis, it is 
difficult to ignore the importance of duration and proximity in evaluating the 
comparability of gatherings in combating an airborne, contagious virus.  And 
despite noting the concurrence’s shortcomings, Justice Kavanaugh himself 
did not directly address or evaluate the criteria of duration and proximity, nor 
did he suggest other justifiable criteria.  Instead, Justice Kavanaugh inquired 
why someone can “safely walk down a grocery store aisle but not a pew?”232  
This statement simply presumes that churches and grocery stores are 
 
 226. Id. at 1615. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d 418, 432 (E.D. Va. 
2020) (classifying grocery stores, banks, and laundromats as essential). 
 232. S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958 
F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020)). 
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comparable but does not address the justification of duration and proximity 
or any justification at all.  Therefore, it is unclear whether Justice Kavanaugh 
believes that duration and proximity are justifiable grounds that were simply 
incorrectly applied or if the criteria themselves are unjustifiable. 
Despite providing intuitive criteria for discerning comparability between 
gatherings, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence raised for more questions 
than answers.  Duration and proximity are helpful and intuitive in theory but 
pose challenges for courts who are dealing with complex and case-specific 
facts. 
2.  Deference to the State 
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion is more often cited for its 
passage on deference.  Chief Justice Roberts declared that it is not the 
judiciary’s place to determine when restrictions on particular gatherings 
should be lifted, for such questions are “dynamic and fact-intensive matter[s] 
subject to reasonable disagreement.”233  Instead, the “politically accountable 
officials of the States” are deemed more equipped to act in areas “fraught 
with medical and scientific uncertainties,” rather than the “unelected federal 
judiciary,” which “lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess 
public health and is not accountable to the people.”234  In doing so, Chief 
Justice Roberts echoed the deference notion raised in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts,235 which stated that a court should not “determine which of 
two modes is likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public 
against disease.”236 
Justice Kavanaugh contested this notion, stating that although the state has 
“substantial room to draw lines, especially in an emergency,” the 
Constitution nevertheless provides key restrictions on line drawing, namely 
that the “[s]tate may not discriminate against religion.”237  The Court must 
be appropriately deferential to the expertise of public health officials in 
evaluating potential distinctions between the secular gatherings listed in the 
orders and religious gatherings.238  But such deference will not justify action 
that is “beyond all question, a plain, palpable” violation of free exercise 
principles.239 
Broadly, the suggestion of deference is a reasonable and important one.  In 
a public health emergency, where there is “no known cure, no effective 
treatment, and no vaccine,” it is understandable for the Court to defer to the 
judgment of the political branches of government.240  Justice Kavanaugh 
 
 233. Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 234. Id. at 1613–14. 
 235. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 236. Id. at 30. 
 237. S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 238. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. 
 239. Id. 
 240. S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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conceded this point, merely stating that the state cannot discriminate against 
religion while exercising such wide discretionary power.241 
However, this deference raises two key issues.  First, this deference may 
thwart meaningful investigation of possible differentiators for evaluating 
general applicability.  By leaving the determination of categorizations to 
“politically accountable officials,” courts do not evaluate whether the state 
action is truly generally applicable but instead accept the justification 
provided by the state.242  This seems irreconcilable with the judiciary’s 
responsibility to protect fundamental constitutional freedoms.  Although the 
judiciary may lack “the background, competence, and expertise to assess 
public health,” the courts are nevertheless the most competent and important 
defenders of constitutional rights.  The issue of comparing establishments is 
critical to the determination of general applicability and, consequently, the 
free exercise claim as a whole; to defer on this key issue may be 
determinative for the claim in its entirety.  Thus, the courts should be 
empowered with further guidance on the protection of fundamental rights 
rather than encouraged to readily defer to the judgment of the political 
branches.  For example, public officials may more competently determine 
the relative impact of singing in the spread of COVID-19.  However, the 
Court should provide guidance to lower courts on how much significance 
singing should be given relative to other criteria to determine general 
applicability.  Although public health may be beyond the judiciary’s 
expertise, state actions may nonetheless deeply affect the very rights that the 
courts were meant to protect.  When it comes to such fundamental 
constitutional rights, courts should be empowered to exercise their 
competence in assessing the validity of free exercise claims before invoking 
deference. 
Second, the scope of deference is left unclear.  Jacobson deference 
requires courts to uphold the exercise of emergency police powers in 
addressing public health measures unless (1) there is no real or substantial 
connection to public health or (2) the state action is “beyond all question” a 
“plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by fundamental law.”243  In other 
words, only the clearest cases of discrimination will defeat deference to the 
state.  However, this seems irreconcilable with Chief Justice Roberts’s 
statement that the categorization of gatherings is a “dynamic and fact-
intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement.”244  If the 
categorization of gatherings is inherently prone to reasonable disagreement 
 
 241. Id. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The State also has substantial room to draw 
lines, especially in an emergency.”). 
 242. In Judge Daniel Collins’s dissent in the Ninth Circuit decision below, he interpreted 
deference to mean that the court was to determine “whether [the Governor’s] actions were 
taken in good faith and whether there is some factual basis for [the] decision.” S. Bay United 
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 2020) (Collins, J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1971)), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 1613.  
Judge Collins emphatically rejected this seemingly low threshold as “fundamentally 
inconsistent with our constitutional order.” Id. 
 243. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. 
 244. S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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and not “beyond all question,” Jacobson deference appears indispensable, 
particularly given that courts have no guidance in comparing entities for the 
general applicability analysis.  Again, this provides wide discretion for courts 
to exercise deference.  Perhaps in close cases, the courts may defer to the 
judgment of the state.  However, such a sweeping justification, as suggested 
in South Bay, may be inconsistent with the judiciary’s responsibility of 
protecting constitutional liberties. 
Ultimately, deference is a reasonable concept in theory but one that must 
not substitute or overshadow the need for a clearer standard for courts to 
better evaluate general applicability.  Otherwise, so long as “broad limits are 
not exceeded,”245 deference allows courts to readily presume a finding of 
general applicability.  The Court in Jacobson recognized that the state’s 
power in dire situations “is not absolute” and may go “beyond what was 
reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the 
courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”246  Thus, in assessing 
the gravity of public health, the courts should not forsake their commitment 
to protecting constitutional rights. 
Accordingly, South Bay demonstrated the need for a clearer standard that 
more carefully compares and contrasts relevant metrics for determining 
which types of gatherings are and are not similar in their risk of spreading 
COVID-19.  Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion provided a step in 
the right direction by offering two possible criteria:  proximity and duration.  
In doing so, the case established two tenets of COVID-19 religious 
exemption cases.  First, if churches are restricted in a similar manner to 
comparable secular gatherings in terms of proximity and duration, then the 
relevant executive order is generally applicable; if generally applicable, no 
further inquiry is required under Smith and the executive order is upheld.  
Second, courts should defer to and recognize the broad limits of state power 
when determining the categorization of businesses and establishments for 
reopening. 
C.  Further Inconsistencies in Post–South Bay Decisions 
Following the South Bay order, some cases adhered closely to Chief 
Justice Roberts’s reasoning when comparing gatherings.  In Legacy Church 
v. Kunkel,247 the District Court of New Mexico concluded that movie theaters 
and concert venues are most like religious mass gatherings in terms of “high 
contact intensity and high number of contacts.”248  Similarly, in Elim 
Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker,249 the Seventh Circuit deemed 
worship gatherings to be more comparable to concerts and lectures than to 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25.  The Sixth Circuit recently echoed this notion, stating that 
“[w]hile the law may take periodic naps during a pandemic, we will not let it sleep through 
one.” Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 247. 472 F. Supp. 3d 926 (D.N.M. 2020). 
 248. Id. at 1037. 
 249. 962 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2020). 
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more leniently treated secular gatherings, such as those that occur at 
warehouses, grocery stores, and soup kitchens.250  Because “movies and 
concerts seem a better comparison group,” the court stated that 
“discrimination has been in favor of religion.”251  Interestingly, the court 
stated its uncertainty as to whether warehouse workers engaged in “the sort 
of speech or singing that elevates the risk of transmitting the virus” or that 
the workers “remain close to one another for extended periods.”252  The court 
admitted that “some workplaces present both risks” but quickly declared that 
it was “hard to see how [essential workplaces] . . . could be halted.”253  In 
some cases, the court did not conduct any comparative analysis.  In Whitsitt 
v. Newsom,254 the Eastern District of California merely reasoned that because 
the California order was not “selectively enforced against religious entities 
or that plaintiff’s church was [not] singled out,” the order was generally 
applicable.255 
However, in some cases, despite being presented with similar gatherings 
and executive orders, courts have differed drastically in their conclusions, 
and such variance in the protection of constitutional liberties warrants greater 
guidance for courts.  In Soos v. Cuomo,256 the Northern District of New York 
ruled in favor of a church despite comparing it to similar establishments as 
discussed in South Bay.  Churches in New York had been restricted to 25 
percent indoor capacity while other nonessential businesses, such as 
restaurants, salons, retail stores, and educational services, were afforded 50 
percent indoor capacity.257  Whereas Chief Justice Roberts noted that 
churches constitute “large groups of people . . . in close proximity for 
extended periods of time,”258 the district court applied this same reasoning 
but in favor of churches, stating that salons themselves “involve the 
congregation of people for a length of time.”259  Additionally, the court noted 
that restaurant patrons “sit and congregate . . . in close proximity for a 
lengthy period of time” while maintaining “close contact with their hosts and 
servers” with no face coverings while seated.260  The court ruled that these 
nonessential businesses were “not justifiably different than houses of 
worship” and thus, the state order was underinclusive.261  The District Court 
of the District of Columbia agreed in Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. 
 
 250. Id. at 346. 
 251. Id. at 347; see also Cross Culture Christian Ctr. v. Newsom, 445 F.Supp.3d 758, 770 
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Bowser,262 similarly questioning why restaurants were treated more 
favorably even though they involve “more than just providing food for 
consumption [but also] serve as focal points for fellowship and communion, 
not unlike worship services.”263  Contrarily, in Legacy Church, the court 
upheld more lenient restrictions for restaurants, reasoning that restaurants are 
“more transitory and so will involve less person-to-person contact.”264 
Another prominent criterion was the indoor-outdoor distinction, primarily 
when comparing religious gatherings to mass protests.  Following the murder 
of George Floyd, protestors gathered in major urban areas throughout the 
nation to call attention to racial injustice and the specific need for police 
reform.  In Soos, depending on the region of New York State, outdoor 
gatherings were restricted to either ten or twenty-five people.265  However, 
Governor Andrew Cuomo and New York City mayor Bill de Blasio endorsed 
the gathering of outdoor mass protests of several hundred people and allowed 
150-person outdoor graduation ceremonies to proceed.266 
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.  Individual exemptions, 
the court argued, signified that the law was “substantially underinclusive” of 
nonreligious conduct that endangered the government’s interest in a similar 
or greater degree than the religious conduct.267  The court first recognized 
the limitation of Chief Justice Roberts’s deference argument––that “there are 
‘broad limits’ which may not be eclipsed.”268  The court concluded that “it is 
plain to this court that broad limits of that executive latitude have been 
exceeded.”269  Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio’s public comments 
encouraging and applauding the protests were deemed to have created a de 
facto exemption.270  Although they “could have just as easily discouraged 
protests, short of condemning their message, in the name of public health,” 
Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio nevertheless “sent a clear message 
that mass protests are deserving of preferential treatment.”271  With the added 
exemption of 150-person outdoor graduation ceremonies, the court 
concluded that the government may not refuse to extend that system of 
exemptions to “cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”272 
Contrarily, the District Court of Colorado in High Plains Harvest Church 
v. Polis273 declared that there was no evidence in the record that would 
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support a finding that outdoor protests are comparable secular gatherings to 
indoor, in-person church services.274  The court reasoned that relief should 
be denied based on the “myriad of differences between the protests and 
[religious] services,” namely that outdoor gatherings pose less risk of 
spreading COVID-19 than indoor gatherings.275  Although the court in Soos 
placed significant weight on the individualized exemption granted to 
protests, the court here categorized the protests as an “unprecedented and 
potentially explosive situation with a modicum of restraint” and found “little 
trouble” in upholding the executive order.276  However, the Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment in High Plains subsequent to the Court’s ruling in 
Roman Catholic Diocese.277 
Thus, although South Bay provided initial criteria for comparing 
establishments, courts were nevertheless unguided on how to apply or 
compare different criteria when evaluating general applicability.  
Subsequently, the Court had an opportunity to step in and provide such 
guidance in Calvary Chapel but ultimately failed to do so. 
D.  Calvary Chapel and the Ultimate Collapse of General Applicability 
During COVID-19 
COVID-19 free exercise jurisprudence reached its climax––and its most 
controversial moment––with the Supreme Court’s order in Calvary Chapel.  
If Lighthouse stands at one extreme, Calvary Chapel stands at the other.  The 
former justified lenient treatment for hospitals during a public health crisis.  
The latter demonstrated that even casinos were favored over free exercise. 
In Calvary Chapel, Nevada restricted religious gatherings to fifty people, 
while other secular gatherings—most notably, casinos and their affiliated 
entertainment venues—were permitted to admit 50 percent of their maximum 
capacities.278  In a 5-4 decision, the Court denied injunctive relief for the 
church.279 
In their dissents, Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh conducted a 
Lukumi analysis in fierce opposition to the decision.  They resoundingly 
agreed that the Nevada orders were not neutral and generally applicable.  
Justice Alito first denounced the decision, claiming that the Constitution 
“guarantees the free exercise of religion” but that it says “nothing about the 
freedom to play craps or blackjack.”280  He further claimed that the departure 
from the Smith standard “is hardly subtle” because the directive “treats 
worship services differently from other activities.”281  Justice Gorsuch found 
“obvious discrimination,” remarking that “[l]arge numbers and close quarters 
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are fine in [casinos and movie theaters]” but churches “are banned from 
admitting more than 50 worshippers . . . no matter the precautions at all.”282  
Justice Kavanaugh simply stated that Nevada is “discriminating against 
religion.”283 
The dissenting Justices subsequently evaluated the Nevada directives 
under strict scrutiny, declaring that “it is apparent that this discriminatory 
treatment cannot survive.”284  Justice Alito argued that the state “cannot 
claim to have a compelling interest” when it leaves “appreciable damage to 
that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.’”285  Justice Alito added that the 
state “has not shown that public safety could not be protected at least as well 
by measures such as those Calvary Chapel proposes to implement.”286  
Notably, Justice Kavanaugh more strictly applied Lukumi, stating that the 
state “must articulate a sufficient justification for treating some secular 
organizations or individuals more favorably than religious organizations or 
individuals.”287  In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, the state had failed to provide 
a “persuasive public health reason for treating churches differently from 
restaurants, bars, casinos, and gyms.”288 
Furthermore, Justices Alito and Kavanaugh rebuked Chief Justice 
Roberts’s deference argument in South Bay.  Justice Alito in particular 
acknowledged the difficulties state officials faced at the outset of an 
emergency and was understanding of the need for courts to tolerate very blunt 
rules.289  However, he noted that at the time of the case, more than two 
months had passed; Nevada had gathered more medical and scientific 
evidence and therefore had had “time to craft policies in light of that 
evidence.”290  Justice Alito raised concerns regarding the scope of deference, 
stating that public officials are not given “carte blanche to disregard the 
Constitution.”291  Justice Kavanaugh echoed this concern, stating that 
“COVID-19 is not a blank check for a State to discriminate against religious 
people.”292 
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Thus, Calvary Chapel has added more complexity to free exercise 
jurisprudence.  Courts that have upheld state executive orders in the face of 
free exercise claims have invoked, among others, the following reasons:  
Secular entities such as hospitals and taxi services were favored because they 
were essential in directly addressing the public health crisis.293  Restaurants 
were found to be distinct from churches because dining experiences were 
typically more transitory than scheduled church services with only a few 
entryways.294  Gatherings such as those at grocery stores were favored 
because they did not involve large numbers of people in close proximity to 
one another.295  Gatherings at retail establishments were preferred because 
they do not entail singing or chanting as is typical of church services.  Some 
courts have favored mass protests because they were held outdoors, as 
opposed to typical worship services and because protests entail constitutional 
freedoms of their own.296 
The facts in Calvary Chapel directly opposed all of these arguments.  
There is virtually nothing essential or constitutional about casinos and their 
affiliated entertainment platforms.297  Visitors to Las Vegas gamble for more 
than two hours per day on average, which exceeds the duration of most 
religious services.298  Even at 50 percent capacity, casinos may draw 
thousands of patrons, with average capacities far exceeding fifty persons per 
venue.299  Live circuses, shows, and bowling tournaments seat hundreds of 
spectators where visitors can sit together.300  The facts of Calvary Chapel 
contradicted nearly every rational justification that courts have used to 
uphold state orders.  And yet the Court still upheld the order.  Justice Gorsuch 
put it best:  “This is a simple case.”301  But the Court somehow still managed 
to uphold a state action burdening religious practice. 
E.  Roman Catholic Diocese:  Another Missed Opportunity by the Supreme 
Court 
In Roman Catholic Diocese, the Supreme Court was presented with yet 
another opportunity to clarify the general applicability requirement.302  
Contrary to South Bay and Calvary Chapel, in this case, the Court granted 
injunctive relief for religious gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic.303  
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However, although the Court presented viewpoints from several Justices, it 
ultimately clarified little on the application of general applicability. 
In Roman Catholic Diocese, Governor Cuomo used COVID-19 metrics to 
designate specific regions as either red or orange and religious gatherings 
were restricted to ten and twenty-five people respectively.304  A church and 
a synagogue submitted applications seeking injunctive relief from these 
restrictions.305  The Court’s opinion, issued per curiam, granted the 
injunctive relief.306  The opinion first noted that establishments such as 
“acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, [and] garages” and a large store with 
hundreds of shoppers were subject to more lenient restrictions.307  The Court 
concluded that such “categorizations lead to troubling results” and such 
“disparate treatment” precludes general applicability.308  Having found 
discrimination, the Court examined the restrictions under strict scrutiny.  The 
Court readily accepted that the state has a compelling interest in “[s]temming 
the spread of COVID-19.”309  However, the Court ruled that the restrictions 
were not narrowly tailored because they were “more severe than has been 
shown to be required to prevent the spread of the virus.”310  Additionally, the 
Court suggested that the state could have enforced maximum attendance 
based on building capacities, a measure that could minimize health risks 
while also minimizing the burden on free exercise.311  Because the state 
failed to carry out more narrowly tailored measures, the Court ruled that the 
restrictions failed strict scrutiny.312  Although Justice Kavanaugh’s 
concurrence was remarkably similar to that of his dissent in Calvary Chapel, 
Justice Gorsuch outwardly criticized Chief Justice Roberts’s deference 
reasoning in South Bay as “towering authority that overshadows the 
Constitution during a pandemic.”313  Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence 
additionally reinforced the discrimination claim, stating that people similarly 
“gather inside for extended periods in bus stations and airports, in 
laundromats and banks” as they do in churches.314 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts provided no clarification on the 
proximity and duration criteria he put forth in his South Bay concurrence but 
defended his deference reasoning as nothing more than a simple assertion 
that the politically accountable officials are entrusted “to guard and 
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protect.”315  In their dissents, Justices Breyer316 and Sotomayor317 returned 
to the reasoning in South Bay that religious gatherings are more akin to 
concerts, lectures, and movies rather than grocery stores, banks, or 
laundromats.  Notably, Justice Sotomoyor stated that South Bay and Calvary 
Chapel provided a “clear and workable rule” for the state when implementing 
executive orders:  “they may restrict attendance at houses of worship so long 
as comparable secular institutions face restrictions that are at least equally as 
strict.”318  This statement is not instructive, however, and is merely a 
reiteration of the very issue that courts continue to grapple with:  how should 
courts discern what are “comparable” gatherings? 
Ultimately, the decisive question in this case was no different from that of 
every other religious exemption case during the pandemic:  are places of 
worship more comparable to laundromats, banks, airports, and grocery 
stores, or are they more comparable to concerts, lectures, and movies?  
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor seem to suggest that science and 
epidemiology should govern, thereby warranting greater deference to the 
political branches.319  The Court’s per curiam opinion and the concurrences 
suggest a wider spectrum of secular analogs where people are likely to gather 
for an extended period of time. 
Nonetheless, the Court has not yet explicitly formulated the relevant 
criteria for comparing gatherings, nor has it provided careful guidance on 
how courts should handle various criteria relevant to discerning general 
applicability.  The Court’s ruling in Roman Catholic Diocese has added yet 
another complication and inconsistency to First Amendment jurisprudence 
during COVID-19. 
III.  DISTINCTIVE TREATMENT FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS UNDER STRICT 
SCRUTINY 
If Smith is overruled and strict scrutiny is the definitive standard, religious 
entities may seek judicial relief even from generally applicable laws.  Strict 
scrutiny provides a heightened standard that is exceptionally demanding.  But 
even under such a legal standard, free exercise of religion should be afforded 
distinctive treatment via a more careful and specific application of strict 
scrutiny.  Courts may use a low standard of rational basis when comparing 
bowling alleys and restaurants.  But when the constitutional right to free 
exercise is at stake, courts should afford maximum protections to religious 
entities and individuals. 
States may nonetheless meet this high standard, particularly given the 
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic.  However, the demanding burden should 
be placed on the state to prove that religion was exempted (or not exempted) 
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due to a compelling state interest.  This distinctive treatment of religious 
freedom is not a novel proposition but one that has been long overlooked 
under Smith. 
Part III.A details the elements of strict scrutiny and how each element can 
be narrowly applied to protect religious liberty.  Part III.B then argues that 
courts should emulate the exemption granted in Yoder in evaluating free 
exercise cases to further support a distinctive treatment of religion. 
A.  Narrower Application of Strict Scrutiny 
Under Smith, cases under the RFRA or state equivalents have already 
demonstrated the use of strict scrutiny to evaluate religious exemption cases.  
In a world where Smith is overruled, courts must further define and 
standardize the strict scrutiny elements to avoid the inconsistency that marred 
the general applicability analyses.  This section argues for a specific and 
narrow application of the strict scrutiny elements to provide as much 
protection for religious liberty as possible. 
1.  Substantial Burden 
Under strict scrutiny, a church must first show a substantial burden on its 
religious exercise.  Generally, courts have readily accepted the assertion that 
gathering restrictions place a substantial burden on religious practice; the 
precise rationales were often presumed or overlooked.320  However, in 
instances where the state challenges the substantial burden on churches, 
courts should defer to the religious parties if the burden is placed on an 
exercise grounded in sincere religious beliefs. 
Free exercise case law establishes that courts are to defer to the religious 
parties’ assertions about their sincerely held religious beliefs.321  For the 
purposes of evaluating substantial burden, however, it is critical to 
understand the religious party’s perspective in conducting a full strict 
scrutiny analysis.  Christian churches believe that their congregations must 
meet in person each week to worship together.  This is rooted deeply in 
Scripture.  Christians believe that God created humans as physical beings 
who are called to gather and worship together.322  The Bible specifically 
designates the church to be a corporate body, not just individuals.323 
The significance of gathering in person is also evident in doctrine and in 
practice.  Most notably, the Lord’s Supper is an intimate and vital sacrament 
for Christian denominations, requiring the physical administering of bread 
and wine as the representation or embodiment of the body and blood of Jesus 
Christ.324  Because the very nature of the Lord’s Supper is a physical sign 
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and seal of a spiritual promise and because the elements are to be set aside 
by a minister, congregants cannot partake of the Lord’s Supper unless 
gathering together physically.325 
A substantial burden exists when a government action rises above de 
minimis inconveniences and places “substantial pressure on an adherent to 
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”326  In other words, questions 
of substantial burden arise when individuals are required to choose between 
following their beliefs and receiving a governmental benefit or when 
individuals must act contrary to their religious beliefs to avoid facing legal 
penalties. 
Nevertheless, despite accepting the sincerity of church beliefs, some cases 
have questioned whether the availability of remote services, multiple 
services, or drive-in services undermines any claims of substantial burden on 
religious practice.  In Capitol Hill, the state asserted that the church could 
“hold multiple services, host a drive-in service, or broadcast the service 
online or over the radio.”327  In doing so, the state argued that the church had 
failed to prove that the gathering restrictions have substantially burdened the 
church’s religious exercise. 
The district court emphatically declared that the state “misses the 
point.”328  The court reasoned that the claimed burden is based on sincerely 
held theological beliefs and that the substantial burden inquiry does not ask 
“whether [the Church] is able to engage in other forms of religious 
exercise.”329  The court declared that it is for the church, not the state, to 
define the meaning of “not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together,” 
as indicated in the Bible.330  Thus, the court declared that restrictions on 
gatherings should be interpreted as “foreclose[ing] the Church’s only method 
to exercise its belief . . . as its faith requires.”331 
Therefore, the availability of other formats for worship should not 
foreclose the finding of a substantial burden under strict scrutiny.  Many 
cases will presume the substantial burden element, but when challenged, 
courts must not judge how individuals comply with their own faith as they 
see it. 
2.  The Compelling State Interest 
The compelling state interest component has also been generally 
presumed.  In Roberts v. Neace,332 the court stated that “no one contests that 
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the Governor has a compelling interest” in combating COVID-19.333  In 
Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear,334 the court similarly stated that 
the state has a “compelling interest in preventing the spread of a novel, highly 
contagious, sometimes fatal virus.”335  In Berean Baptist Church v. 
Cooper,336 the court concluded that “no one contests the Governor’s 
compelling interest in seeking to prevent the spread of COVID-19.”337 
However, these broad notions fall short of fully protecting religious 
liberties.  Rather, courts should apply a closer reading of strict scrutiny under 
the RFRA, highlighted in O Centro Espirita.  There, in examining 
exemptions for the religious use of the drug hoasca, the Supreme Court 
rejected the state’s assertion that controlling a substance having “a high 
potential for abuse” was a compelling state interest sufficient to survive strict 
scrutiny.338  Instead, the Court stressed that under strict scrutiny, the burden 
at issue must be on the person.339  In other words, the Court required “an 
inquiry more focused than the Government’s categorical approach”340––an 
approach that focused solely on “the particular use at issue here.”341  
Therefore, rather than asserting the general importance of the state to regulate 
harmful substances, the state was required to provide a compelling state 
interest to explain why hoasca specifically should not be exempted. 
Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, courts must “look[] beyond 
broadly formulated interests” of combating the spread of COVID-19.  
Instead, courts must examine whether the state has adequately provided a 
compelling justification for excluding religious worship from more favorable 
executive order categorizations.  Justice Kavanaugh advocated for this 
position in his dissent in South Bay, stating that California’s compelling 
justification required a distinction between the religious worship services in 
question and the secular businesses not subject to occupancy restrictions.342  
He repeated this assertion in his dissent in Calvary Chapel, stating that 
Nevada had failed to demonstrate how the public health justification 
specifically applied to allowing looser restrictions for casinos and bars but 
not churches.343 
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This narrower approach is subtle, but it is critical in providing an additional 
layer of protection for religious freedoms.  Although preventing the spread 
of COVID-19 was sufficient to satisfy rational basis under Smith, strict 
scrutiny challenges the states to provide a fuller and narrower justification 
for limiting constitutional rights.  This is not an undue burden on states 
because it leaves ample room for states to nevertheless succeed if the 
justification is sufficiently compelling.  Such a high standard is appropriate 
in safeguarding the constitutional right to exercise one’s religion. 
3.  Narrowly Tailored:  The “Least Restrictive Means” Standard 
Most gathering restriction cases during COVID-19 have hinged on the 
second requirement of “least restrictive means.”  Some courts that were 
generous in accepting states’ broad formulations of compelling state interests 
nevertheless imposed injunctions finding the states had failed to satisfy the 
least restrictive means criterion.  In evaluating this element, courts must more 
carefully and more strictly apply the standard in three particular ways:  (1) 
permitting substitute forms of worship should not render restrictions on in-
person worship narrowly tailored, (2) a favoring of analogous secular 
conduct is indicative of a violation of the least restrictive means standard, 
and (3) the willingness of religious entities to conform their religious exercise 
according to health requirements must be taken into account. 
First, some cases have considered the availability of other platforms of 
worship to signify—not the lack of substantial burden—but that the order 
was the least restrictive means.  In essence, states argued that because only 
in-person services were restricted and other platforms were left intact, the 
order was least restrictive in its application.  This severely misses the point.  
As mentioned, the presumption of viable substitutes for worship undermines 
the churches’ right to determine its form of worship based on sincerely held 
beliefs.344  To presume the validity of these substitutes is a misconception of 
the sincere, religious basis for in-person worship.  The necessity of in-person 
religious worship “is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of 
deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately 
related to daily living.”345  The court in Neace further added that the state 
cannot presume that “every member of the congregation has access to the 
necessary technology” or that “every member of the congregation must see 
[such technology] as an adequate substitute.”346 
Second, the favoring of analogous secular gatherings should indicate that 
the state had, at its disposal, options for achieving its objectives that would 
burden religion to a far lesser degree.  In Berean, the state could not provide 
a rationale for allowing fifty people to gather indoors at a funeral but 
restricting indoor church gatherings to ten individuals.347  Therefore, the 
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court ruled that the assembly for religious worship provisions were “not 
narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling interest in protecting public 
health.”348  In Maryville, the Sixth Circuit invoked the Kentucky equivalent 
of the RFRA, which parallels the RFRAs enacted by Congress and by other 
states.349  In evaluating the Kentucky governor’s executive order that allowed 
“typical office environments” but restricted drive-in church services, the 
court determined that the order “[did] not amount to the least restrictive way 
of regulating the churches.”350  The court questioned why the state permitted 
hundreds of cars to be parked in parking lots but reprimanded those who 
wished to park in a lot for religious purposes.351 
Third and relatedly, even if there are no direct secular analogs, a court 
should take into account a religious organization’s willingness and attempts 
to incorporate health requirements when discerning the least restrictive 
means.  For example, in South Bay, churchgoers were willing to implement 
social distancing measures, “requiring congregants to wear face coverings, 
prohibiting the congregation from singing, and banning hugging, 
handshakes, and hand-holding.”352  Under Smith, the court would not be 
obligated to consider these circumstances but only to evaluate whether 
churches in general should be excluded from more favorable categorizations.  
However, under a stricter application of least restrictive means, the Court 
may have acknowledged the church’s efforts to minimize its risks sufficient 
to achieve the state’s compelling interest.  By voluntarily “regulating the 
specific underlying risk-creating behaviors,” the court held that the state can 
nonetheless achieve its ends while minimizing the burden on religious 
exercise.353 
B.  Reinstating Yoder-Like Exemptions 
Such a careful and more precise application of the strict scrutiny test is not 
a novel proposition.  In fact, this was precisely the basis on which the 
Supreme Court decided Yoder, the one true religious exemption case.354  The 
Court first concluded that there was a substantial burden on religious 
practice, finding that the compulsory education requirement through age 
sixteen was “in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of 
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life.”355  Second, the Court narrowly applied the compelling interest test, 
declaring that where “fundamental claims of religious freedom are at 
stake . . . we cannot accept such . . . sweeping claim[s]” of state interest.356  
Instead, the Court stated that it was the state’s responsibility to specifically 
show “with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in 
compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption 
to the Amish.”357  Third, the Court ruled that compulsory education through 
the age of fourteen accomplished the state’s interest in maintaining an 
educated citizenry.358  Because the state interest could be achieved while 
placing far less of a burden on Amish values, the Court ruled that the 
compulsory education requirement was not narrowly tailored.359  Ultimately, 
the Court granted the Amish an exemption from the compulsory education 
requirement. 
Such granting of religion-based exemptions was preempted by Smith, 
limiting Yoder’s reasoning to be only applicable to “hybrid rights” cases.  
However, a close reading of Yoder, as elucidated by Justice O’Connor in 
Smith, demonstrates that the Court based its decision squarely on the Free 
Exercise Clause alone and not on parental rights.360  The Court explicitly 
concluded that testimony, history, and practice support the claim that 
“enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education 
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise 
of respondents’ religious beliefs” with no reference to parental rights.361  
Such a claim was justified because the Amish were “capable of fulfilling the 
social and political responsibilities of citizenship without . . . jeopardizing 
their free exercise of religious belief.”362 
Justice David Souter, in his concurrence in Lukumi, similarly challenged 
the hybrid distinction as “untenable.”363  Justice Souter reasoned that 
according to Justice Scalia’s definition of a hybrid claim, the scope of hybrid 
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exceptions would be “so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”364  Additionally, 
if a hybrid claim involves another constitutional provision that is sufficient 
ground for obtaining an exemption from a neutral and generally applicable 
law, then “there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls 
the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.”365  
Ultimately, Justice Souter was not persuaded and believed that “fundamental 
claims of religious freedom [were] at stake.”366  Professor Michael 
McConnell stated that, by its own account, Smith itself should have been 
classified as a hybrid case and undergone higher scrutiny.367  Professor 
McConnell ultimately concluded that “the Smith Court’s notion of ‘hybrid’ 
claims was not intended to be taken seriously”368 and that one may 
reasonably “suspect[] that the notion of ‘hybrid’ claims was created for the 
sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in [Smith].”369 
If Smith is overruled, Yoder must be freed from this controversial “hybrid-
rights” designation by Justice Scalia.  As a practical matter, under Smith, 
Yoder was typically regarded as either an exception to the general Smith rule 
or as a “constitutional anomaly” to standard exemption analyses.370  
However, Yoder has long been considered to be the “high watermark of free 
exercise protection”371 and a “pinnacle of judicial recognition of free 
exercise exemptions.”372  Its principled approach to examining free exercise 
cases afforded substantial protections for religiously motivated conduct.373 
Perhaps under Yoder as the commanding law in free exercise 
jurisprudence, religious gatherings may have a claim to injunctive relief even 
in situations where all other secular gatherings are restricted.  Rather than 
comparing religious gatherings to secular analogs, courts must look to grant 
an exemption to religious parties “save in the most extreme 
circumstances.”374  Certainly, COVID-19 has presented an abundance of 
such extreme circumstances, and the state may reasonably and successfully 
defend its executive orders.  Thus, free exercise claimants undoubtedly face 
a very steep hill in seeking exemptions during COVID-19; solely allowing 
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churches to open alongside hospitals is understandably a far-fetched 
objective. 
However, Yoder, at the very least, makes such claims possible and allows 
free exercise claims to be tested against the harshest state laws.  If state 
actions are nevertheless upheld via strict scrutiny under Yoder, free exercise 
claimants can be reassured that the severity of the public health situation 
compels the curbing of the fundamental right to exercise religion.  The 
decision, however, should not be marred by inconsistent treatment of religion 
under a low standard when a higher standard can afford better protections for 
religious freedoms while nevertheless maintaining the state’s ability to assert 
a compelling state interest. 
The instinct to protect religious liberty is certainly not novel in American 
history, nor is it limited merely to the religious.  Justice Blackmun, in his 
dissent in Smith, stated that the very purpose of drafting the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses was “precisely in order to avoid [religious] 
intolerance.”375  James Madison stated that “[t]he Religion then of every man 
must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man” and it must be 
maintained as a “right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”376  
Madison affirmed that “[i]t is the duty of every man to render to the Creator 
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.”377 
In sum, should Smith be overruled, the Supreme Court should support a 
narrow application of strict scrutiny to discern whether a state action that 
burdens the free exercise of religion should nevertheless be upheld.  This 
narrow and demanding standard affords distinctive treatment for religious 
liberties.  This proposition is grounded in a simple principle:  constitutional 
rights deserve the highest protection.  As Professor E. Gregory Wallace 
stated, “[r]eligion requires special constitutional treatment precisely because 
it involves something transcendent, objective, normative, and exclusive.”378  
Fundamental rights are, by their very nature, inalienable and essential and 
deserve the utmost protection by the judiciary. 
CONCLUSION 
COVID-19 gathering restrictions have exposed the current Smith standard 
as misguided and inconsistently applied.  Such an inconsistent standard 
cannot be the determining factor in free exercise exemption analyses because 
it undermines the distinctive treatment religion deserves.  The narrow 
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application of strict scrutiny under a Yoder-like analysis elevates free 
exercise to a higher standard so that states rely significantly on the 
compelling nature of the state interest rather than on comparisons with 
secular analogs.  This Note does not advocate undermining state efforts in 
combatting COVID-19.  It fully recognizes that individual rights secured by 
the Constitution may nonetheless accommodate state efforts to combat a 
pandemic.  However, fundamental rights must always be afforded distinctive 
treatment, for the true strength of constitutional guarantees shines brightest 
when applied unhesitatingly in times of peace and crisis alike. 
